

Facility ID: _____
Bureau / Line Office: _____
Location: _____
Servicing Security Office: _____
Date FSL Determined: _____

**Office of Security
Department of Commerce
ISC Facility Security Level Determination Matrix**

Factor	Points				Score
	1	2	3	4	
Mission Criticality	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	VERY HIGH	
Symbolism	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	VERY HIGH	
Facility Population	100	101-250	251-750	750	
Facility Size	10,000 sq. ft.	10,001-100,000 sq. ft.	100,001-250,000 sq. ft.	250,000 sq. ft.	
Threat to Tenant Agencies	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	VERY HIGH	
					Sum of Above
Facility Security Level	I 5-7 Points	II 8-12 Points	III 13-17 Points	IV 18 or more Points	Preliminary FSL
Intangible Adjustment	Justification				+/-1 FSL
					Final FSL

Facility Manager or Designated Official Signature: _____

Date: _____

Agency or Facility Servicing Security Officer Signature: _____

Date: _____

Note: Use the following Facility Security Level Scoring Criteria to determine the FSL. Indicate or highlight each score, value, and criteria (s) used to select each of the five factors being considered:

7.0 Facility Security Level Scoring Criteria

7.1. *Mission Criticality*

The value of a facility to the government is based largely on the mission of the facility, particularly as it may relate to NEFs and other important business of the government. As vital as it is for the government to perform these activities, it is equally attractive to adversaries to disrupt important government missions. The “Mission Criticality” score is based on the criticality of the missions carried out by tenants in the facility (not by the tenant agencies overall). In a multi-tenant facility, the highest rating for any tenant in the facility should be used for this factor.

Continuity of Government (COG) and Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) documents are a good source of information regarding the performance of Essential Functions.

Score	Value	Criteria	Examples
Very High	4	National leadership, seats of constitutional branches. Houses chief officials for a branch of government.	White House
		Communications centers that support national essential government functions	White House Communications Agency facilities
		Houses officials with authority to order the mobilization of armed forces, or essential communications equipment necessary to carry out defense and intelligence activities	Intelligence community facilities including communications and weapons/munitions storage
		Houses individuals necessary to advance American interests with foreign governments	State department, US embassies and consulates
		Houses elected or appointed government officials of foreign nations	Foreign embassies and consulates in the US
		Houses individuals with the knowledge or skills necessary to identify and analyze threats to homeland security. Contains specialized equipment necessary to analyze or secure information regarding threats.	Coast Guard, ports of entry Law enforcement engaged in counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics
		Houses personnel or specialized equipment necessary to identify and/or respond to large-scale or unique incidents.	Police and fire stations; emergency operations centers national response assets (e.g., Urban Search And Rescue teams; Nuclear Emergency Support Teams)
		Houses Individuals with responsibility for making decisions regarding National fiscal or monetary policy, regulating financial markets, or other essential regulatory functions for the National economy.	Department of Commerce building
		Contains amounts of currency, precious metals, or other material necessary to maintain economic stability.	US Mint facilities, Federal Reserve buildings, Bureau of Engraving and Printing
		Houses specialized analytic, monitoring or communications equipment necessary to process or monitor financial transactions necessary for the Nation's economy.	National Finance Centers
		Houses individuals with specialized knowledge or skills, specialized equipment, or materials necessary to detect, respond to, or prevent unique public health incidents.	Centers for Disease Control
		Houses material or information that, if compromised, could cause a significant loss of life;	Department of Energy research reactor facilities
		Storage of production quantities of chemicals, biohazards, explosives, weapons, etc. – where the storage is of an operational nature.	Ammunition or explosives storage facilities
		Continuity of Government facilities.	FEMA Emergency Operations Center
High	3	Original, irreplaceable material or information central to the daily conduct of government	National Archives
		Designated as a shelter in the event of an emergency incident.	National Archives
		Regional or headquarters policy and management oversight	GSA National Capitol Region headquarters, SSA HQ
		Biological/chemical/radiological/medical research or storage of research and development (de minimis) quantities of chemicals, biohazards, explosives, etc.	Plum Island Animal Disease Research Center
		COOP facilities for department and agency HQs	GSA Willow Woods Facility
		General criminal investigative work	Fraud, financial, non-terrorism-related crime
		Judicial process	Federal courts
Medium	2	District or state-wide service or regulatory operations	Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Services District Office
		COOP facilities for other than national HQs	GSA Regional Office COOP site
Low	1	Administrative, direct service or regulatory at a local level	Agriculture County Extension Office

7.2. Symbolism

The “Symbolism” of the facility is considered from both a target attractiveness and consequence perspective. The symbolic value is first based on external appearances or well-known/publicized operations within the facility that indicate it is a United States Government facility. Transnational terrorists often seek to strike at symbols of the United States, democracy, and capitalism. Domestic radicals may seek to make a statement against government control, taxation, or regulation.

Symbolism is also important because of the potential negative psychological impact of an undesirable event occurring at a prominent federal facility. Attacks at certain government facilities, particularly those that are perceived to be well-protected and central to the safety and well-being of the United States, could result in a loss of confidence in the U.S. government domestically or internationally.

It is also necessary to recognize that even if there are no external appearances or well-known operations of the U.S. government, a mixed-tenant facility may be symbolic to terrorists with other motivations. For example, facilities such as financial institutions, communications centers, transportation hubs, controversial testing laboratories, etc., may be symbolic in the eyes of single-interest radicals and international terrorist organizations, the leadership of which have stated that strikes against the American economy are a high priority. Assessing symbolism of non-DOD federal facilities on a DOD campus should be handled similarly.

Score	Value	Criteria	Examples
Very High	4	Popular destination for tourist;	Smithsonian museums
		A nationally significant historical event has occurred at the facility;	Independence Hall
		Widely recognized to represent the Nation's heritage, tradition, or values;	White House, US Capitol, Supreme Court Building
		Contains significant original historical records or unique artifacts that could not be replaced in the event of their damage or destruction	National Archives, Smithsonian Museums
		Executive department headquarters building	Department of Justice, Department of Transportation Headquarters
		Other prominent symbol of US power or authority	US Circuit, District or Bankruptcy Courthouses, CIA Headquarters
High	3	Well-known, "regional" US government facility.	Oklahoma City Federal Building
		Agency/Bureau headquarters	GSA Central Office, EPA HQ, Bureau of Land Management, SSA HQ
		Located in a symbolic commercial financial building	Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center
		Co-located with other highly symbolic facilities	On a DOD campus/base
Medium	2	Readily identified as a US Government Facility based on external features	Signage stating "Federal Office Building", Great Seal of the United States, Seals of Departments and Agencies on exterior
		Readily identified as a US Government Facility based on the nature of public contact or other operations (even without external features)	SSA Field Office
		Dominant, single federal facility in a community or rural area	VA Clinic
		Commercial lab or research facility that may be symbolic to single-interest radicals	Animal testing facility
Low	1	No external features or public contact readily identifying it as a US government facility.	Classified locations, Small offices in leased commercial buildings

7.3. Facility Population The infliction of mass casualties is an acknowledged goal of many terrorist organizations. Recovered terrorist pre-operational surveillance reports include considerable details on the times of day that the target population is at its highest, and do not distinguish between tenants and visitors. From a consequence perspective, the potential for mass casualties is always a major consideration.

Thus, “Facility population” is based on the peak total number of personnel in government space, including employees, on-site contract employees, and visitors. This number should NOT include transient influxes in population due to an occasional conference (or similar event), unless the facility is intended for use in such a manner (such as a conference center) and the population is “part of normal business.” Transient shifts in population such as the occasional conference should be addressed by contingency security measures.

The number of daily visitors should be determined using the best metrics available to ensure the most accurate population. Ideally, this would be through reviewing visitor logs or access control lists; however, it may necessitate an estimate or a short-term sampling of visitor throughput.

Facilities such as stand-alone parking garages should be considered to have a “population” of less than 100.

Due to the sensitive nature of child care centers located in Federal facilities, every child care center or facility with a child care center merits a Population score of “Very High” and point value of 4.

Score	Value	Criteria
Very High	4	Greater than 750 or facilities with Child Care Centers
High	3	251 to 750
Medium	2	101 to 250
Low	1	Less than 100

7.4. Facility Size

“Facility size” is based on the square footage of all federally occupied space in the facility, including where an agency with real property authority controls some other amount of space in the facility. If the entire facility or entire floors are occupied, “gross” square footage should be used (length x width); if only portions of floors are occupied in a multi-tenant facility, “assignable” or “rentable” square footage should be used.

Size may be directly or indirectly proportional to the facility population. An office facility with a large population will generally have a correspondingly large amount of floor space; however, a large warehouse may have a very small population.

For a terrorist, an attack on a large, recognizable facility makes for more extensive press (video) coverage. However, it should also be understood that large facilities require a more substantial attack to create catastrophic damage, requiring more planning and preparation by adversaries, which could be a deterrent.

From a consequence perspective, the cost to replace or repair a large facility is a major consideration. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) considers the cost to rebuild a facility in determining the potential economic impact of a successful attack.

Score	Value	Criteria
Very High	4	Greater than 250,000 square feet
High	3	100,000 to 250,000 square feet
Medium	2	10,000 to 100,000 square feet
Low	1	Up to 10,000 square feet

7.5. Threat to Tenant Agencies

Unlike “Criticality of Mission,” which is considered in terms of consequences, “Threat to Tenant Agencies” is considered from a target attractiveness perspective. The facility should be viewed in terms of whether the nature of public contact required in or resulting from the conduct of business is adversarial, or, if there is a history of adversarial acts committed at the facility, against facility tenants, or against the tenant agencies elsewhere.

The highest score applicable to any tenant in a multi-tenant facility will be considered when determining the FSL, even though it may be possible to limit the implementation of countermeasures for that threat to a specific tenant’s space or part of the facility.

As with the impact of commercial tenants on the facility’s symbolism score, the potential threat to non-federal tenants in a mixed-tenant facility could result in a collateral threat to federal tenants. Thus, in considering the criteria, the threat to all tenants in a facility – including non-federal – should be considered and the highest used for the rating.

Score	Value	Criteria	Examples
Very High	4	Tenant mission and interaction with certain segments of the public is adversarial in nature	Criminal and Bankruptcy Courts High Risk Law Enforcement - including those who routinely contact or attract the attention of dangerous groups (FBI, ATF, DEA)
		Tenant mission is controversial in nature and routinely draws the attention of organized protest groups	EPA, DOE, courthouses World Bank, International Monetary Fund
		Located in a high-crime area	As determined by a characterization established by local law enforcement
		Significant history of violence directed at or occurring in the facility. More than 10 incidents per year requiring law enforcement/security response for unruly or threatening person in site	As determined by security organization or tenant incident records.
High	3	Public contact is occasionally adversarial based on the nature of business conducted at the facility	Non-Criminal/Administrative courts where privileges, benefits, etc. may be suspended or revoked; General law enforcement operations; National Labor Relations Offices
		History of demonstrations at the facility	Bridge at border station in CA
		Located in a moderate-crime area	As determined by a characterization established by local law enforcement
		History of violence directed at the facility or the occupants. 5-10 incidents per year requiring law enforcement/security response for unruly or threatening person on site.	As determined by security organization or tenant incident records.
Medium	2	Generally non-adversarial public contact based on the nature of business conducted at the facility	General/Internal Investigations Inspection services for the Department of Agriculture; State Department Passport Office
		History of demonstrations against the tenant agency (not at facility)	NRC, CIS
		Located in a low-crime area	As determined by a characterization established by local law enforcement
		History of violence directed at tenant agencies/companies (not at facility)	IRS Offices, SSA
Low	1	Generally little to no public contact	Government warehouses or storage facilities; Small Business Administration, Federal Trade Commission
		No history of demonstrations at the facility	As determined by security organization or tenant incident records.
		No history of violence directed at the facility or the occupants	As determined by security organization or tenant incident records.

7.6. Intangible factors

It is not possible to take into account all the conditions that may impact the FSL decision for all the different federal departments and agencies. Certain factors, such as a short duration of occupancy, may reduce the value of the facility in terms of investment or mission, which could justify a reduction of the FSL. Such factors are in essence indicative of a reduced value of the facility itself, and a corresponding reduction in consequences of loss.

Other factors may suggest an increase in the FSL, such as proximity to a highly-attractive neighboring facility which could be the target of an attack which could result in collateral damage, or designation as critical infrastructure.

Accordingly, the FSL may be raised or lowered one level at the discretion of the deciding authority based on intangible factors. However, the intangible factor should not be used to raise or lower the FSL in response to a particular threat act. The FSL characterizes the entire facility; concerns about specific threats should be addressed with specific countermeasures, even if they are over and above that required as the baseline for a particular security level.

Short-term events could also temporarily affect the factors evaluated here. Unless these events happen on a recurring basis, they should not affect the FSL determination. Instead, contingency plans should be developed to implement temporary measures until the event has passed. For example, a week-long conference may increase the population of a facility substantially during the conference, but it should not be considered in the FSL determination; however, if the facility is a conference center that normally holds such gatherings, the population during those conferences should be factored in to the FSL.

Like all risk-management decisions, it is important to document these intangible factors and the resulting adjustments made to the FSL score. Any intangible factors and the associated adjustment should be documented by the decision-making authority and retained as part of the official records for the facility's security.